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362 HARVEY v. DAVIS [69 C.2d 
[So F. No. 22241. In Bank. Sept. 13, 1968.] 
CLARENCE B. HARVEY et aI., Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. HENRY D. DAVIS et at, Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Real Property Securities Dealers-Business of Selling.-De-
fendant husband and wife, by buying plaintiffs' $80,000 real 
property for 24 promissory notes secured by second deeds of 
trust, engaged in the business of selling real property securi-
ties within the meaning, and in violation, of the Real Property 
Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10237 et seq.), 
despite plaintiffs' agreement to this form of payment and the 
lack of evidence of any other similar transaction by defend-
ants, where defendants, ignoring ibe license, bond, permit, fin-
ancial statement and appraisal requirements of the aet, 
answered plaintiffs' newspaper advertisement and in transact-
ing the purchase dealt exclusively through agents and obtained 
the $80,000 in notes from a mortgage company for only 
$52,000, thus indicating defendants' willingness to conduct 
business with members of the public chosen at random for :the 
plimary purpose of retailing the notes for a profit, of 
$28,000. I 
[2] ld.-Sale to the Public-Test.-In determining whether a sale 
is to ·the public within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 10237, 10238.3, regulating the sale of real property securi-
ties, the distinetion to be made is not between sales to one (or 
a few) and sales to many persons, but betwecn sales to those 
whom the Legislature deemed able to protect themselves and 
sales to those deemed unable to do so. 
[S] ld.-Civil Liability-Exemptions.-Defendant husband and 
wife who, in violation of the licensing and other provisions of 
the Real Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, I 
§ 10237 et seq.), purehased plaintiffs' real property with prom-
issory notes secured by second deeds of trust, were not 
exempted from civil liability by the 1961 provisions of Bus. & " 
Prof. Code, § 10237.1, making the reguilltions inapplicable, in 
effect, to persons selling such notes through a real property 
securities dealer, where, although defenda~ts bought the notes ( 
from such a dealer to effect the transactIOn, the dealer was 
unlicensed and in any event acting exclusively as agent for 
[lJ Who is "dealer" under state securities acts exempting sales \ 
by owners other than issuers not made in course of successive ! 
transactions, and the like, note, 6 A.L.R.Sd 1425. t 
[3J See Cal.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 27. . 
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Real Property Securities Dealers; i 
[5] Statutes, § 202. 
) 
I 
I 
J 
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third parties, leaving defendants themselves as the principals 
in the realty transaction, and where, although such trans-
action was negotiated by defendants with a licensed real estate 
broker, the broker was not licensed as a real property securi-
ties dealer and was in any event acting as plaintiffs' agent to 
sell their property, not as defendants' agent to sell their notes. 
[4] ld.-Civil Liability-Exemptions.-The 1961 provisions of 
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10237.1, exempting from civil liability, for 
violations of the Real Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 10237 et seq.), any persons selling through a real 
property securities dealer, reflected a legislative determination 
that adequate protection will be afforded members of the puh-
lie if they deal with real property securities dealers who are 
fully responsible for complying with the act, and thus' real 
property securities dealers must be licensed as such to bring 
the exemption into play. 
[5] Statutes-Liberal and Strict Construction-Coverage and Ex-
emption Provisions in Regulatory Statutes.-Exemption pro-
visions in regulatory statutes are narrowly construed when 
such a construction is necessary to accomplish the purposes of 
the act, and coverage provisions are broadly construed to ac-
complish these purposes. Thus, just because: "real property 
securities dealers" in the exemption provisions of the Real 
Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10237 et 
seq.) must be construed as dealers properly licensed as such, it 
does not mean that they must be so construed whenever those 
words occur in the act. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. Peter Anello, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages sustained in selling real property in 
exchange for promissory notes secured by second deeds of 
trust. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed. 
Field, DeGoff & Rieman and Sidney F. DeGoff for Defend-
ants and Appellants. 
Weir, Hopkins, Jordan & Mitchell, Weir, Hopkins, Donovan 
& Zavlaris, John F. Hopkins and Robert H. Weir for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Herbert E. Wenig, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Burch Fitzpatrick, Deputy 
Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on bellalf of Plaintiffs and 
Respondents . 
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-In February 1963 plaintiffs Clarence 
and Stella Harvey, who owncd improved real property in Los 
Gatos, listed the property for sale with Grant Rowe, a li-
censed real estate broker. Defendant Henry Davis answered 
Rowe's advertisement of the property and expressed interest 
in buying it for himself and his wife. After preliminary nego-
tiations, the Davises submitted a written offer through Rowe 
to exchange for the property notes of a face value of $80,000 
s('eured by deeds of trust to be approved by the Harvt>ys. 
Rowe told Davis that the Harveys were willing to make the 
exchangc. Davis got in touch with the Rylee Mortgage and 
Invt>stment Company and learned that it had a package of 32 
1I0tes secured by second deeds of trust that Davis could pur-
chase at a substantial discount. Twenty-four of the notes hlll1 
a face value of $80,000. Davis instructed Rylee to show Rowe 
nnd Harvey·the 24 notes and deeds of trust and the property 
K('euring them. He told Rylee that if Harvey approved tlIP. 
notes and deeds of trust, the Davises would buy the whole 
package of 32 notes and arrange for :Rylee to sen the remain- I 
ing eight to some other buyer or buyers. Harvey approved the 
24 notes and deeds of trust, and the Davises bought tllem 
through .Rylee for $52,000. They placed them in escrow 
togetller with an assignment to tile Harveys and they were 
delivered to the Harveys on closing the escrow. 
Each note was for $3,350 at 7.2 percent interest and was 
one of a series of notes each of wllich was secured by a second 
deed of trust on a different lot in a subdivision in Santa Clara 
County. Each had been executed on January 10, 1963, by 
defendants Joseph E. Strawther and Bobbie Gene Strawther 
on behalf of t.heir alter ego defendant Canary Construction 
Company as obligor and in favor of their alter ego dcfendant. 
Portola Enterprises as obligee. 'Vhen the Harveys took the 
notes in exchange for their real property. the first deeds of 
trust on the properties securing the notes were already in 
default, and the holder of the first deeds of trust started 
foreclosure proceedings a f('w days later. After t.lle fore-
(·Iosures the notes secured by the second del'ds of trust were 
wortllless. 
The Harv('ys brought this action against Mr. and Mrs. 
Davis, the Rylee Mortgage Company .• Joseph and Bobbie 
~trawther. Portola Enterpris{'s, the Canary Construction 
Company, and othl'J·s. They allf'g"pd three causes of action: one· 
based on 1'1'(11111, on!' basl'd 0)) vioIatio))s of the Real Property 
Securities DenIers Act, find Olle for money had and received. 
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After a nonjury trial, the court entered judgment against tlw 
defendants named above for damages suffered by plaintiffs 
from defendants' failure to comply with the provisions of the 
Real Property Securities Dealers Act. Only the Davises 
appeal. 
The R~al Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 10237 et seq.) was enacted in 1961 to protect the 
investing public by regulating the marketing of highly specu-
lative promotional subdivision second trust deeds and sales 
contracts. (See Final RePQrt of the Subcom. on Real Estate 
Contracts and Trust Deeds, 2 Journal of the Assembly (Reg. 
Srss. 1961) Appendix, 23 Assembly Interim Com. Report No. 
] 5; "Trust Deed Securities, The Ten Percent Business," 
Rcport of the Attorney General to the Legislature, March 
1961; Mayer, Protection of the Investor in Real E.state and 
Real Property Securities in California (1962) 9 U.C.L.A. 
L.Rev. 643, 656-664.)1 It contains comprehensive provisions 
designed to keep worthless promotional securities like those 
involved in this case off the markct. A person dealing in real 
property securities as defined in the act2 must be a licensed 
real estate broker who has secured an endorsement to his 
license to act as a real property securities dealer (§ 10237.3), 
lAppended to the act as passed was the following explanation: 
, 'Emergency legislation controlling and regulating the market in mort-
gages and trust deeds was enacted at the 1960 (First Extraordinary) 
Session of the Legislature. Since that legislation became effective serious 
irregularities in the mortgage market have been discovered and the in-
vestments of many people have been placed in great jeopardy. TIIi~ 
deplorable situation was discussed in the 'Final Report of the Subcolll-
mittee on Real Estate Contracts and Trust Deeds,' of the Ass(>Jlluly 
Interim Committee on Judiciary-Civil, dated December 1960. The Legis-
lature finds that the bulk of promotional trust deeds as herein defined were 
sold by so·called trust deed companies and brokers, purchasing and sellin~ 
such notes and real property sales contracts developed through subdivision 
financing. As was pointed out in the report of the Attorney General 
to the Legislature on 'Trust Deed Financing,' dated March Hlii1, such 
notes and real property sales contracts were sold upon appraisals of 
value far in excess of actual fair market value and subjected the purchas-
ing public to all the financial risks in subdivision promotion and con-
struction. Millions of dollars have been lost by investors through numer· 
ous defaults on such notes and real property sales contracts. Permanent 
legislation is urgently needed to provide uniform and effective regulation, 
nnd to give stability to the mortgage and trust deed market." 
2The 1961 version of the Real Property Securities Dealers Act was 
effective on the date these transactions took place. Since then, the L('gis-
lature has amended the act three times. All references, unless othenvis" 
specified, are to the 1961 version of the act and to the Business nnd 
Professions Code as of that date. 
Section ]0237.1 defines a real propm·ty secul'ity to include: 
" (b) One of a series of prolllotionn 1 not(>8 secured hy limls on separate 
parcels of real property in one subdivision or in contiguous subdivisions. 
\ 
I 
I 
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and he must file a bond and allnual reports with the Real 
Estate Commissioner. (§§ 10237.8,10237.9.) No real property 
security may be sold3 to the puLlic unless a permit is obtained 
from the Real Estate Commissioner. (§ 10238.3) Before be-
coming obligated, purchasers of such securities must be pre-
sented with a financial statement setting forth essential faets 
bearing on the value of the seeurities and the dealer's esti-
mate of that value (§ § 10237.4, 10237.5). Appraisals must be 
made of the properties involved (§ 10237.6), and the commis-
sioner may prevent deeeptive advertising (§ 10237.7). Every 
person sustaining an injury from a violation of the act may 
reeover damages from the real property securities dealer in-
volved.4 Criminal pcnalties are provided for wilful violations 
(§ 10238.6). 
In the present ease, the trial court found that the notes and 
deeds of trust that the Davises sold to the Harveys were real 
property securities within the meaning of section 10237.1, that 
the IIarveys were not provided with the finaneial statement 
required by sections 10237.4 and 10237.5, and that no permit 
was obtained for the sale of the notes and deeds of trust. It 
found that the Davises were principals in the transaction as 
"(c) One of a series of real propel'ty sales contracts pertaining to 
separate parcels of real property in one subdivision or in contiguous sub· 
divisions, all of which arc executed by one person or persons associated 
together as owners. 
" . . . . . . . . . . . . 
"As used in this section 'promotional note' means a promissory note 
secured by a trust deed executed on unimproved real property, or exe· 
cuted after construction of an improvement of the property but before 
the first sale of the property as so improved, or executed as a means of 
financing the first purchase of the property as so improved, and which 
is subordinate or which by its terms may become subordinate to any other 
trust deed on the property, except when such note was executed in excess 
of three (3) years prior to being offered for sale. 
"Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this section do not apply to a person 
who sells or exchanges a note or contract through a real property se-
curities dealer." 
SSection 10237.2 provirles: "As used in this article 'sale' or 'sell' 
includes every issuance, creation for resale, disposition or attempt to 
dispose of a real estate security fOT value and includes all of the follow-
ing, whether done directly or by circular letter, advertisement, radio or 
television broadcast or otherwise: an offer to sell, an attempt to sell, a 
Eolicitation of a sale, a contract of sale or an exchange." 
4Section 10239.4 provides: "Every person sustaining an injury result-
ing from a transaction suhject to this article which was in violation of 
the provisions of the article may recover in a civil action against the real 
property securities dealer the amount of the damages with interest at 
7 percent per annum from the date of the injury, and shall be entitled 
to be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee. Any such action shall be 
brought within two (2) years from the date of the transaction or the 
date the injury was discovered, whichever is the later." 
I 
I 
\ 
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defined in section 10237 and concluded that they were liable 
for damages and attorney's fees under section 10239.4. 
Section 10237 defines a real property securities dealer as 
"any person, acting as principal or agent, who engages in the 
business of; (a) Selling real property securities to the pub-
lic, ... " and section 10239.4 provides for the recovery of 
damages and attorney's fees from such a dealer. In view of 
the fact that the trial court held the Davises liable under 
section 10239.4; the only reasonable interpretation of its find-
ing that they were principals as defined in section 10237 is 
that they were real property securities dealers engaged in the 
business of selling real property securities to the public. 
[1] The Davises contend that there is no evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding on the ground that aU that 
apprars is an isolated transaction in which they did no more 
than exchange for the Harveys' real property preeisely wllll t 
the Harveys asked. They urge that such purchasers of real 
property can in no sense be deemed to be engaging in the 
business of selling real property securities to the public, 
particularly when the transaction is not initiated by them. 
Although there is no evidence that the Davises sold any rcal 
property securities other than the 24 notes and deeds of trust 
sold to the Harveys, the evidence fully supports the conclu-
sion that they engaged in the business of selling real property 
securities to the public. By answering the newspaper adver-
tisement of the Harveys, persons whom they had never known 
and with whom they dealt exclusively through agents, thc 
Davises indicated a willingness to conduct business with mpm-
bers of the public chosen at random. (Securities &- Exchange 
Com. v. Ralston Purina Co. (1953) 346 U. S. 119, 125, fn. 11 
[97 L.Ed. 1494, 1498, 73 S.Ct. 981]; Mary Pickford Co. v. 
Bayly Bros., Inc. (1939) 12 CaU~d 501, 514-515 [86 P.2d 
102].) Although it was apparently not carried out, their plan 
to buy and sell the remaining eight notes and deeds of trust is 
also evidence of such willingness. By arranging to pay for 
property worth approximately $80,000 with notes and deeds 
of trust that they could secure for $52,000, they demonstrated 
that the controlling business purpose of the transaction was 
not the purchase of the Harveys' real property but the retail-
ing of 24 notes and deeds of trust at a profit of $28,000. It is 
immaterial that the Harveys initiated the transaction by put-
ting their real property on the market and may have stipu-
lated that the price be paid in notes secured by deeds of trust 
instead of cash. The Real Property Securities Dealers Act, 
\ 
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like similar rcgulatory statutes, presupposes willing buyers, 
indeed they are thc vcry persons such legislation is designed 
to protect. Had the Davises complied with the act and deliv-
ered the financial statement required by sections 10231.4 and 
10237.5, it is inconceivable that the Harveys would havc i 
parted with property worth $80,000 in exchange for notes and 
deeds of trust that could be purchased for $52,000 and that 
,,,ere actually worthless. 
'rhe conclusion tllat the Davises were engaged in the busi-
ncss of selling real property securities to the public within the 
meaning of section 10237 when they sold the 24 notes and 
deeds of trust to tIle Harveys, is supported by related provi-
Rions of the Business and Professions Code. When the Legis-
lature enacted the Real Property Securities Dealers Act, it 
also enacted section 10131.1 of the Business and Professions 
Code to broaden tIle definition of a real estate broker to in-
elude" a person who engages as a principal in the business of 
buying from, seIling to, or exchanging with the public, real 
property sales contracts or promissory notes secured directly 
or collaterally by liens on real property, •.. " That section 
df'fines "in the business" to mean the acquisition for resale 
to tIle public or tIle sale or exchange with the public of thrf'(l 
or more ·real property sales contracts or secured promissory 
notes per year. Thus, in section 10131.1 the Legislature 
defined engaging in business in terms of the number of con-
tracts or notes sold instead of in terms of the number of 
transactions involved. It would be unreasonable to assume 
that the Legislature used the same words, "engages in the 
business of," in the Real Property Securities Dealers Act, to 
regulate only greater amounts of business activity than are 
defined in section 10131.1 of the Business and Professions 
Code. The Real Property Securities Dealers Act imposes addi-
tional and more stringent regulation on those dealing in the 
more speculative types of real property securities where the 
need for regulation is presumably the greatest. It is clear, 
therefore, that a sale of 24 notes secured by deeds of trust 
constitutes engaging in tIle business of selling within the:l. 
meaning of section 10237. ~, 
I.legislative history also makes it clear that such a sale made;; 
to a person selected at random from the public is a sale to the 'I 
public wit1lin the meaning of the act. The requirement of a II 
sale to the public as a prerequisite to regulation was not in I 
the bill as illtroducf'd in the 1961 session of the Legislature.! 
(A.B. 1344, § 10238.1 (as amended May 22,1961).) When the j 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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bill was later amended to include the requirement of a sale to 
the public (A.B. 1344, §§ 10237, 10238.3 (as amended May 30, 
1961», it was also amended to provide that "The sale to 
corporations; pension, retirement or similar trust funds; or to 
institutional lending agencies shall not be deemed a sale to th(' 
public for the purposes of this article" (A.B. 1344, § 10237 
(as amended May 30, 1961)). In 1963 attorneys and real 
estate broker licensees were added to the list of excluded pur-
chasers (§10237.25, added Stats.1963, ch.1291, p. 2817, §4), 
and in 1965 general building contractor licensees were als() 
added. (§ 10237.25 as amended Stats. 1965, ch. 1796, p. 4138, 
§ 2.) Thus, the Legislature has defined the public to excludt' 
groups of buyers that would appear to be either experts in tllP 
field of investments or to be well informed in the field or 
real estate transactions. [2] Accordingly, in determining 
whether a sale is to the public within the meaning of sections 
10237 and 10238.3 the distinction is not between sales to one 
or a few and sales to many 'persons but between sales to those 
whom the Legislature deemed able to protect themselves and 
sales to those deemed unable to do so. 
[3] The remaining question is whether the Davises are 
exempted from civil liability by the provision of section 
10237.1 that "Subdivisions (b) and (c) [defining real 
property securities] do not apply to a person who sells or 
exchanges a note or contract through a real property securi-
ties dealer. "G 
The Davises contend that they sold the notes and deeds of 
trust through Rylee, a real property securities dealer, and 
that the exemption applies whether or not Rylee was licensed 
as such a dealer. There is no merit in these contentions. 
The evidence supports the trial court's findings that the 
Davises were principals in the Davis-Harvey transaction and 
that Rylee was exclusively the agent of Portola, Canary, and 
tIle Strawthers. The Davises did not sell the notes and deeds 
of trust through Rylee. Instead, they bought them from Rylee, 
acting as agent for Portola. and sold them to the Harveys. 
Although the sale was negotiated by Davis with Rowe, Rowe 
was not the Davises' agent to sell the notes and deeds of trust 
but the Harveys' agent to sell their property. In any event, 
~In 1963 this paragraph was deleted from section 10237.1 and its sub· 
stance incorporated in the definition of a real property securities dealer 
ill section 10237: "A p~l'BOIl who sells Or exehangtls a real property se· 
curity as defined by subdivisions (b) or (e) of Section 10237.1 through 
a real property securities dealer 81lall not be deemed to be It real propCl'ty 
securities dealer because of such sale or exchange." 
I. 
I 
! 
'I , 
i 
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Rowe was not a real property securities dealer. Accordingly, 
the sale was not made through a real property securities 
dealer within the meaning of the exemption. 
To hold otherwise would create a serious gap ill thc regula-
tory scheme. Section 10237.4 requires the real property securi-
ties dealer to providc the buyer with the financial statement 
describing the securities before the buyer becomes obligated to 
complete the transaction. Since Rylee did not sell the notes 
and deeds of trust to the Harveys, but merely allowed Harvey 
to inspect them at Davis' request, Rylee was under no obliga-
tion to furnish a financial statement to the Harveys. It could 
have complied with section 10237.4 by providing the required 
financial statemcnt to the Davises. If, however, Rylee's sale to 
the Davises to ellable them to sell to the Harvey's rendered 
the latter sale a sale conducted through a real property 
securities dealer within the meaning of section 10237.1, no one 
would be obligated to furnish the Harveys with a financial 
statement and the statutory purpose to protect them as poten-
tial purchasers would be defeated. 
[4] Moreover, even if the sale had been made through 
Rylee within the meaning of section 10237.1, it would be 
incumbent on the Davises to prove that Rylee was a licensed 
real property securities dealer to bring the exemption into 
play. 'rhe exemption reflects a legislative determination that 
adequate protection will be afforded members of the public if 
they deal with real property securities dealers who are fully 
responsible for complying with the act. Such protection would 
be substantially vitiated if an owner of real property securi-
ties could sell them through an unlicensed dealer without in-
curring any responsibility on his own part to comply with the 
act. The purpose of the act to proteet the investing public 
precludes such an interpretation. 
[5] There is obviously no merit in the contention that to 
interprpt the words real property securities dealer in the 
exemption to mean a licensed dealer requires the same inter-
pretation whpnever those words oecur in the act. To so hold 
would lead to the ridiculous result of excusing all persons J' 
selling real property securities to the public from COmPlYing" 
with thc act ulIless they clected to become licensed under sec- '. 
tion 10237.3. The cOlltention overlooks the essential distinction 
between exemption and coverage provisions in regulatory stat- I 
utes. The former arc narrowly construed when such a con-
struction is necessary to accomplish the purposes of the act, I 
and the latter are broadly construed to accomplish those pur-
) 
poses. (See Loss and Cowctt, Blue Sky Law (1958) pp.81-83, 
130; 1 Loss, Securities Regulation (1961) pp. 710-713; Se-
curities & Exchange Com. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra, 346 
U.S. 119; iSilver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski (1961) 55 
Cal.2d 811; 814 [13 Cal.Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906, 87 A.L.R.2d 
1135]; Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., supra, 12 
Cal.2d 501; 514.) 
./ The jUdgment is affirmed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied October 9, 
1968. 
